The current paper is the rst to report an experimental study of Min and Max induced rankings, i.e. a family of set rankings that require preferences over sets to be induced from comparison of the best and/or worst elements within those sets. When pitted against the Uniform Expected Utility criterion (UEU), the Min and Max induced rankings perform particularly worse in predicting real-life decision makers' preferences. The latter nding prompted us to investigate their axiomatic underpinnings by means of pairwise choice experiments. From this investigation, some important conclusions can be drawn: Axioms that prevent rankings to be based on total-goodness, as well as monotonicity conditions (ensuring that replacing a set element with a better one results in a better set) cannot be refuted. Axioms that rule out any utilization of the relative dierence in position of the elements and axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness are all systematically violated. The UEU criterion seems to meet the apparent shortcomings of the Min and Max induced rankings. Some frequently occurring preference patterns, however, suggest that a signicant portion of the participants uses neither a Min or Max induced ranking, nor UEU, but some other unspecied decision rule, possibly characterized by the tendency to prefer a diversication of uncertainty.
Introduction
One can distinguish among dierent models for decision making by the quantity of information they require. In models for decision under risk, a unique and objectively known probability distribution over the possible outcomes is available to guide one's decision. In this respect, von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) formulated the rst classical axiomatization of Expected Utility, the most widely known model for choosing among objective probability distributions. Models for decision making under uncertainty, on the other hand, assume that objective probabilities do not necessarily exist. Savage (1956) argued that in such situations the decision maker acts as if she assigns her own subjective probabilities to the states of nature associated with the various possible outcomes. As demonstrated by the Ellsberg paradox, however, situations exist in which people do not act upon the usual probability rules.
Other theorists investigated the concept of complete uncertainty or ignorance, which describes situations where the decision maker has no information about the probabilities of the outcomes, nor about their likelihood ranking. Usually, the resulting models follow the classical Savagian approach by dening a decision or an action as a mapping from the set of possible states of the world to the set of outcomes (e.g., Arrow & Hurwicz, 1972; Cohen & Jaray, 1980; Maskin, 1979; Milnor, 1954; Luce & Raia, 1957) . Nonetheless, scenarios exist for which the idea of states of the world is pointless because the decision maker does not have any notion at all of which particular state might lead to a given outcome, or because the number of possible states of the world is extremely large. For these scenarios, the previously described families of models are not adequate; they call for the development of models that associate each decision directly with a set of possible outcomes. As such, the problem of ranking decisions according to one's preferences will be reduced to the ranking of sets of outcomes. Therefore, we will refer to these kinds of decisions as set rankings".
Models within this domain are surveyed by Barberà et al. (2004) . All of these models were axiomatically characterized, that is, axioms which take into account the decision maker's preferences over outcomes are imposed on the relation over the set of nonempty subsets of the universal space of outcomes. These axioms typically refer to reasonable attitudes towards uncertainty by the decision maker, as well as particular consistency conditions. An important observation in the domain of set ranking is that various combinations of plausible axioms imply that people rank sets by considering exclusively their best and worst elements. Indeed, in most rankings that have emerged in the literature, such as Maximin, Maximax, Minmax, Maxmin and their lexicographic extensions, an essential role is granted to the maximum and minimum of the sets to be compared. We will refer to these decision models as Min and Max induced rankings.
For example, people who choose according to the Maximin decision rule, will base their decision on comparison of the worst elements only. If the worst elements of the sets to be compared are equal, the decision maker using Maximin will be indierent. The Maximax rule entails a comparison of the best elements only. Pattanaik & Peleg (1984) provided characterizations of Leximin and Leximax.
Like Maximin, the Leximin rule starts with comparing the worst elements or minima when deciding between two sets. However, if both minima are equal, the decision maker is not indierent but she will eliminate the worst elements from both sets and compare the reduced sets by their minima. If once again these reduced sets have the same minimum, the procedure will be repeated until a situation is reached in which the reduced sets each have a dierent minimum and a preference can be stated, or until one set is exhausted before the other in which case the nonempty set will be preferred. The Leximax rule, on the other hand, is the dual of the former in the sense that it starts with comparing the maxima after which it successively eliminates identical maxima. If by using Leximax, one set is eliminated completely while some elements of the other remain, the empty set will be preferred. A decision maker using either Leximin or Leximax will only be indierent between two sets if they are completely identical.
The Minmax and Maxmin 2 rules (Arlegi, 2003) treat the best and worst elements in a lexicographical fashion. According to Minmax, comparison of the minima will be the primary criterion for ranking sets. In the case where the minima coincide, a decision maker following Minmax will proceed to comparing the maxima. An indierence will be stated when the minima as well as the maxima of both sets are identical. The Maxmin rule is the dual case in which the decision maker rst considers the maxima in the sets to be compared, and when these are identical, she will go on to comparing the minima. Bossert et al. (2000) axiomatically characterized the Lexicographic Minmax rule where the decision maker initially proceeds as under Minmax. However, instead of 2 Note that the Maxmin rule is not the same as the Maxi min rule described in one of the previous paragraphs.
immediately imposing indierence in case of a`tie', she will eliminate the best and worst elements of both sets and apply the Minmax rule to the reduced sets. This procedure will be repeated until a preference can be stated. Should one of the sets be exhausted in this process of repeated elimination whereas the other is not, then the nonempty set will be declared better than the empty set. The Lexicographic Maxmin rule is dened analogously.
As mentioned, all of these models were characterized by means of various plausible and intuitively appealing axioms which we will discuss later in this paper. Besides, they can also be intuitively motivated as reecting certain internal attitudes of the decision maker vis-à-vis the choice problem, such as one's risk aversion, the extent to which one is ready to iterate in the case of a tie, or the propensity to aim attention at particular characteristics of the sets (Arlegi, 2001 ).
Moreover, justication for these kinds of sequential processes in which only a limited number of attributes is taken into account can be found in the literature on bounded rationality, a concept introduced by Simon (Simon, 1955 (Simon, , 1956 (Simon, , 1990 which accounts for the observation that perfectly rational decisions are often not feasible in practice due to limitations in the computational resources available for making them. Simon argues that people rather satisce than optimize; as soon as an alternative is found that meets one's aspiration level, the decision process is cut short. The aforementioned Min and Max induced rankings, which imply that people concentrate on certain focal features of a decision situation, being the worst or the best outcome (or the second-worst or second best if the previous ones coincide), at the risk of ignoring potentially relevant information, perfectly t the concept of bounded rationality. Furthermore, Gigerenzer and colleagues argue that simple step-by-step rules or heuristics can yield adaptive decisions in various situations (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001) . Research has also shown that simple heuristics are often more accurate in predicting actual decision behavior than models of optimal choice (Czerlinski et al., 1999; Dawes, 1979; and that they can even lead to better decisions (e.g., DeMiguel et al., 2009) It is interesting to point out that almost all of the rankings described in the literature are element-induced (Arlegi, 2001) , that is, preferences over sets are induced from the comparison of certain elements within the respective sets. Element induction, however, is not the only possible way of comparing and evaluating sets.
For instance, a utility function can be dened over the universe of outcomes in addi-tion to which additive operations could be performed. An example of such a decision rule is the Uniform Expected Utility criterion, which was characterized by Gravel et al. (2007) . This model closely resembles the classical Expected Utility criterion:
sets are ranked in accordance with the expected utility of their elements, but, since no information about the probabilities is available, the decision maker acts as if all outcomes within a set are equally probable.
So far, set rankings have only been adopted in some elds of economic analysis and models are mainly intended to be normatively appealing and useful in applied situations. The Min and Max induced rankings, for example, allow for the construction of a set ranking based exclusively on the observation of the preference relation over singletons. In our view, however, it would be interesting to investigate whether these rankings can prove themselves valid in the descriptive sense as well. So far we know of only one study that has adopted such a descriptive approach (i.e., Vrijdags, 2010 ). In the current article, we will examine the descriptive validity of the Min and Max induced rankings by two methods.
First, we will attempt to test their overall validity by presenting a series of choices for which the Min induced rankings predict a dierent choice pattern than the Max induced rankings and by analyzing the number of participants showing each pattern. Secondly, since it will be shown that neither of these models t the data, the individual axioms characterizing them will be tested in order to obtain a more detailed account of what goes wrong in particular. In the last section we will attempt to give some structure to the abundance of data gathered by testing every single axiom. The axioms will be grouped according to certain characteristics and the obtained clues as to how to model observed set rankings will be discussed.
Experimental method
The data for this paper were gathered in two experiments, Experiment I and Experiment II. For both experiments, participants were recruited by way of an e-mail in which they were asked to complete an Internet questionnaire regarding decision behavior. These questionnaires comprised a number of pairs of sets with numbers, representing monetary amounts in EUR, as the set elements. For each of these pairs the participants were asked to state their preference by clicking a radio button besides the preferred set. In the instructions it was explained that each set could be conceived of as a lottery in the form of a container holding one hundred tickets. On each of these tickets, one of the amounts in the set is printed. However, the frequencies of each of the amounts in the container is unknown. For example, a set {28, 17} can be thought of as a container holding an unknown number of tickets with 28 printed on them as well as an unknown number of tickets with 17 printed on them, both of which sum to one hundred. In order to play the lottery, one ticket would be drawn at random from the container, and the amount on it would be the prize to be won in euros. In this case, choosing a set comes down to choosing the lottery one would rather play.
Choices appeared as in Figure 1 Each choice was presented twice with the position of the sets (rst or second row) counterbalanced since, as explained in the next section, the proportion of preference reversals between replications of the same choice is needed to estimate the error rate for that choice.
In the rst replicate, the choices were presented a rst time. In the second replicate, the whole series was repeated. Within each replication, the order of presentation of the choices was randomized. It was repeatedly stressed in the instructions that the proportions of the dierent numbers in the containers, and thus the probabilities of winning the respective monetary prizes, were unknown. Participants were also informed that ten of them would be selected at random to play one of their chosen lotteries for real money.
A total of 101 people participated in Experiment I, which comprised 55 experimental choices, presented twice. Most of them were students in the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University, 82% were female and 92% were between 18 and 25 years of age. Experiment II consisted of 33 choices, presented twice. A total of 131 students participated in Experiment II, 77% of which were female, and 91% of which were 23 years of age, or younger.
In order to test whether certain observed preference patterns are real", rather than produced by random error, the true and error model proposed by Birnbaum (Birnbaum, 2004; Birnbaum & Bahra, 2007) was used. This model allows each person to have a dierent true pattern of preferences, and it allows each choice to have a dierent rate of error.
True and Error model
When choices are not too obvious to make, participants' responses to the same pair of sets cannot be expected to be fully consistent across multiple presentations.
Since none of the representations in set ranking comes with a natural source of randomness, we need to impose some probabilistic structure. Dierent models of error arose in the literature on this subject (e.g., Sopher & Gigliotti, 1993; Harless & Camerer, 1994; Hey & Orme, 1994) . In this paper the true and error model, proposed by Birnbaum (2004) is applied. This error model resembles that of Sopher & Gigliotti (1993) , except that it uses repeated presentations of the same choices in order to unambiguously estimate the error rate for each distinct choice.
The true and error model assumes that preferences are subject specic, i.e., each subject is allowed to have a dierent true preference order. A subject's true preference order will not change when he or she is repeatedly presented with the same choice, but on any given trial there exists a possibility of making an error in evaluating his or her true preference. Presumably, the more dicult a choice is, the higher the error rate will be for that choice.
For example, consider a choice between two sets, F and S. If this choice is presented twice, there are four possible response patterns, F F if F is chosen both times, F S if one switches from F to S , SF if one switches from S to F , and SS if S is chosen both times. In this case, the observed pattern SS can come about in two mutually exclusive ways: the subject truly prefers S and made two correct reports, or the subject truly prefers F and made two errors. The theoretical probability that a person would choose the second gamble on both replicates, P (SS), is then given by the following expression:
(1)
where p represents the probability of truly preferring S to F , and e represents the error rate for this choice.
Similarly, the probability of switching from F in the rst replicate to S in the second replicate is given as follows:
This model implies that the probability of switching from F to S equals the probability of switching from S to F . Therefore, the probability of either type of preference reversal equals 2e(1 − e).
The probability of choosing the rst gamble twice is given by:
The extension of this model to evaluate properties that comprise more than one choice is explained in the next section.
Comparison of Min and Max induced rankings and UEU
We do not assume that all people use the same decision rule for stating a preference between sets of outcomes. As pointed out, most rules that are standard in the eld postulate that the decision maker starts by focussing on the elements she considers as representative or focal in each set, and then compares the sets by contrasting their respective focal elements.
People who are cautious or risk-averse, for example, might focus on the least attractive outcomes, the minima. If these people, in deciding between two sets,
give absolute priority to the maximization of the minimum at the risk of ignoring potentially relevant information, they might be using the Maximin, Leximin, Minmax 
Predictions
Each row in Table 1 represents a dierent pair of sets for which the participants were asked to state a preference. For example, predicted preference for the rst set in choice 13 is indicated by F 1 in Table 1 , predicted preference for the second set is indicated by S 1 , and so on. As can be seen in Table 1 , the minima and maxima of the sets to be compared never coincide. Under these circumstances, decision behavior according to the element induced-rules described above will fall into two categories:
decisions based on the minimum if people follow one of the Min induced rankings, and decisions based on the maximum if their decision strategy matches one of the Max induced rules. 
The Min and Max induced rankings make dierent predictions for Choices 13, 25, and 3, administered in Experiment I. In the last three columns, F i denotes a predicted preference for the rst set; S i indicates a predicted preference for the second set.
The data pattern implied by the Min induced rankings will be indicated by When the expected utilities are calculated for each set in the way prescribed by UEU (where we assume for simplicity that u(x) = x for these rather small amounts 3 ), these are the highest for sets F 1 , F 2 and S 3 in choices 13, 25 and 3, respectively.
Thereby, the predictions of UEU agree with the Min induced rankings in choice 13
and with the Max induced rankings in choice 25. For choice 3, both Min and Max induced rankings predict a preference for set F 3 . Yet, UEU prescribes that people will choose set S 3 ; despite the fact that its minimal as well as its maximal outcomes are lower than those in set F 3 , it still has a higher expected utility.
Evidently, other decision strategies that imply pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 can be thought of besides UEU. Consider for example a rule according to which people compare the ratio of`high' and`low' outcomes in each set in order to decide. In choice 13, for example, 1 EUR can be considered a low outcome, while 5 EUR, 6 EUR and 7 EUR can be regarded as higher ones. The rst set thus contains nothing but high outcomes, whereas 50% of the elements in the second set is low, yielding a preference for the rst set. The same rule would predict a preference for set F 2 in choice 25 since it contains one high and one low outcome as opposed to only one low outcome in set S 2 , and set S 3 would be preferred in choice 3, where two out of three outcomes are high as opposed to one out of two in the rst set.
Results
We used the true and error model (Birnbaum, 2004) presented in the introduction to estimate the error rates (e) and the true probability of preferring the second set (p) for each choice. 3 u(x) = x is just one possible utility function for which these predictions hold. If the utility function were of the form u(x) = x β , the predictions are correct for all β's within the interval ]0, 2.95]. Contrary to the predictions of the Max induced rankings, merely three percent of all participants is estimated to have a true preference for set S 1 in choice 13.
For this choice, the majority thus seems to comply with the predictions of the Min induced rankings and UEU. A dierent phenomenon occurs in choice 25 where the results contradict the Min induced rankings. In choice 3, the modal response only agrees with UEU. In spite of its lower minimum and maximum, the estimated rate of true preference for the second set, S 3 , is 86.5%.
Unlike the Min and Max induced rankings, which fail to predict the modal response in two out of three choices, UEU correctly predicts all three modal choices.
The frequencies of each response pattern for the complete sequence of three choices have been tabulated in Table 3 . Since the three choices were presented twice, there are 2 6 = 64 possible response patterns in total. Many of these 64 patterns have null frequencies, therefore, the data were pooled into 16 cells as follows. For each of the eight preference patterns in Table 3 , the number of times it was shown on both replicates was counted as well as the number of times it was shown on either the rst or the second replicate, but not both, divided by two. For example, in the rst row of Table 3 it is shown that 16 out of 101 participants demonstrated pattern F 1 F 2 F 3 on the rst replicate, and 18 did so on the second replicate. Out of these, six people showed pattern F 1 F 2 F 3 on both replicates. The number of times F 1 F 2 F 3 was shown on either the rst or the second replication, but not both is then given by (16 − 6) + (18 − 6) = 22. In order to avoid that responses with a dierent pattern in the rst and second replicate are counted twice (once for the pattern in the rst replicate and once for the pattern in the second replicate), this number is divided by two, which yields 11. Grouping the 64 frequencies of the complete patterns over the two replicates in the way described above yields the 16 mutually exclusive frequencies in the fourth and fth column of Table 3 . From these 16 frequencies, which sum to the total number of participants, there are three error probabilities and eight true probabilities to be estimated. showed each pattern for the rst presentation of these three choices (the rst replicate), the second presentation (the second replicate), and both presentations, respectively. The column labeled One not both contains the number of people who showed that pattern on one of the two replicates but not both divided by two. Estimated error rates are 0.041, 0.107, and 0.176 for Choices 13, 25, and 3, respectively. Evaluation of the true and error model yields χ 2 (5) = 4.52, an acceptable t (α = .05).
The true and error model can straightforwardly be extended to estimate the proportion of individuals with a given true preference pattern for the sequence of three choices (Birnbaum & Gutierrez, 2007; Birnbaum & Bahra, 2007; Birnbaum & Schmidt, 2008 , 2010 .
For example, suppose that a person shows the pattern predicted by UEU, i.e., F 1 F 2 S 3 , on both replicates. There are eight dierent ways in which this pattern can occur, each of them corresponding to one of the eight possible true preference patterns.
For instance, the conditional probability that someone demonstrates F 1 F 2 S 3 on both replicates, given that the person's true pattern is F 1 F 2 F 3 is as follows:
The observed preference pattern is indicated with quotations marks, as opposed to a true pattern without quotation marks. Furthermore, e 1 , e 2 and e 3 denote the error probabilities in the three respective choices. In this particular case, the decision maker stated her preferences correctly in each replicate of the rst two choices, choices 13 and 25, but made an error on both replicates of the third choice.
The joint probability of displaying response pattern "F 1 F 2 S 3 , F 1 F 2 S 3 and at the same time having the true pattern F 1 F 2 F 3 (making the same mistake in both replicates) is given by
where p(F 1 F 2 F 3 ) is the theoretical probability that someone's true pattern is F 1 F 2 F 3 . The overall probability of a person demonstrating response pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 in both replicates, P ("F 1 F 2 S 3 , F 1 F 2 S 3 ), is the sum of eight terms like the above, one for each of the eight true patterns.
Similarly, the overall probability of showing F 1 F 2 S 3 in one replicate (the rst or the second), irrespective of the response on the other replicate is given by:
Using elementary algebra and probability theory, it can be shown that the average probability of showing pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 on one replicate or the other, but not both is obtained with:
The extended true and error model was t to the 16 frequencies in Table 3 .
Error estimates obtained from the replication data in the previous analysis were used. From these 16 frequencies that have 15 degrees of freedom (they sum to the total number of participants), there are three error terms and eight true probabilities to be estimated. Since the probabilities of the eight possible patterns sum to one, this leaves 15 − 3 − 7 = 5 degrees of freedom to test the t of the true and error model.
The column labeled estimated true probability in Table 3 shows the estimated true probabilities of each pattern, which were estimated to minimize the χ 2 between observed and predicted frequencies. For this analysis, χ 2 (5) equals 4.52, which is not signicant (with α = 0.05), suggesting that the general true and error model can be retained. With this model, 82.1% of all participants are estimated to have
, the pattern predicted by UEU, as their true pattern.
The patterns predicted by the Min induced rankings and the Max induced rankings were both very rare:
Discussion
With the aim of providing an indication as to what extent real life decision makers actually make decisions in accordance with the element-induced decision rules described in the introduction, we devised a sequence of three choices for which Min induced rankings, Max induced rankings and UEU each predict a dierent choice pattern.
The results provide a strong refutation of the Min and Max induced rules since only a very small percentage of people seems to base their decisions on minimal or maximal outcomes only, ignoring other relevant information. In this study, UEU performs much better, the pattern predicted by UEU was followed by the great majority of participants. Of course, UEU is not the only possible decision rule that can account for these results.
The results do not reveal which specic decision rule(s) is (are) used by the vast proportion of participants who showed pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 , but they do demonstrate, however, that it is not a Min or Max induced ranking.
As pointed out in the introduction, each of these rankings has been characterized by means of axioms imposed on the preference relation between sets. It has been clearly demonstrated that the Min and Max induced rankings fail to t the data, which indicates that at least some of these axioms are not satised by the participants.
In the next sections we will explore exactly which axioms are systematically violated and which appear to be valid 4 . Knowledge thereof might be useful if one aims to design a decision model which is able to accommodate actual choice behavior. In order to construct empirical tests for the axioms, we attempted, where possible, to devise our choice stimuli in such a way that we believe they are most likely to yield violations. In most cases this was done by assuming that real-life decision makers perform some averaging operation over the outcomes in each set.
Axiom tests
Prior to continuing, some notation should be claried.
An ordering is a reexive, transitive and complete binary relation, and a linear ordering is an antisymmetric ordering. A linear preference ordering is a linear ordering with the interpretation at least as good as. Let X be a nonempty and nite universal set of outcomes.
The set of all nonempty nite subsets of X is denoted by X.
Elements of X are interpreted as sets of possible outcomes under uncertainty, where the decision maker does not know any probability distribution, nor any likelihood ranking of the possible outcomes. Let R denote a linear preference ordering over X. The asymmetric factor of R is denoted by P . Let be an ordering over X. The interpretation of is such that A B if and only if the set of possible outcomes A ∈ X is considered at least as good as the set of possible outcomes B ∈ X by the decision maker. Furthermore, denotes the asymmetric factor of .
Leximin & Leximax
Axioms and Stimuli. In this section, we will explain in detail the axioms characterizing Leximin and Leximax as formulated by Pattanaik & Peleg (1984) as well as the stimuli used to test them. It should be noted that every axiom in this paper was tested by means of more than one (combination of ) choice(s). In order to avoid 4 Although Maximin and Maximax are widely mentioned as basic decision rules for ranking sets of outcomes, we did, however, not nd an explicit axiomatization in the context of set ranking. As a consequence, we will not provide any detailed empirical analysis of these decision rules. Nonetheless, it is suspected that the axioms needed for the characterization of Maximin and Maximax will not dier substantially from the axioms tested in the next sections.
needlessly complicating this paper, only one test for each axiom will be reported, namely the test for which the most violations were observed 5 .
Dominance: For all A ∈ X, for all x ∈ X,
[yP x for all y ∈ A] ⇒ A A ∪ {x};
Dominance requires that adding an element which is better (worse) than all elements in a given set A produces a set that is better (worse) than the original set.
Given the interpretation of , Dominance is often considered a basic requirement for the ranking of sets of possible outcomes.
As shown in Table 4 , this axiom was tested in Experiment I, with choices 31 and 32. In choice 31, the second set contains the same outcomes as the rst set plus one additional outcome, 13 EUR, which is worse than every outcome in F 1 , resulting in set S 1 = {28, 17, 13} which, in the case where Dominance holds, should be considered less attractive than set F 1 = {28, 17}. Similarly, people should also prefer F 2 = {37, 28, 17} to S 1 = {28, 17} according to Dominance.
Neutrality: For all A, B ∈ X, for all one-to-one mappings ϕ : A ∪ B → X,
Neutrality implies that the relation R is not aected by changes in two sets A and B that preserve the relative rankings of all elements in A ∪ B. This rules out any utilization of the relative dierences in position of the outcomes. Consider choices 1 and 15 in Table 4 and suppose that a decision maker prefers F 1 = {15, 10} to S 1 = {11}. In this case, Neutrality requires that she prefers F 2 = {25, 15} to S 2 = {24} as well, since the mapping from F 1 and S 1 to F 2 and S 2 does not change the relative rankings of the elements in both sets.
Bottom Independence: For all A, B ∈ X, for all x ∈ X such that yP x for all y ∈ A ∪ B, 5 An exhaustive listing of all the data gathered in Experiment I and II can be found in Table 15 . (Pattanaik & Peleg, 1984 
Bottom Ind 20 * I
Disjoint Ind 30 I F 2 = {100, 10} S 2 = {90, 95, 10} * Choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the rst position, and set F in the second position when presented for the rst time. These positions were reversed in the second replicate. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
A B ⇒ A ∪ {x} B ∪ {x}.
Top Independence: For all A, B ∈ X, for all x ∈ X such that xP y for all y ∈ A∪B,
Bottom Independence requires that if there exists a strict preference between to sets A and B, adding the same element to both sets, an element which is worse than any of the outcomes in either of the two original sets, should lead to a relative ranking of the resulting sets which is the same as that of the originals. Top Independence is its dual, where the added element is better than all of those present in the original sets. Disjoint Independence applies to situations where A and B are disjoint. Here, the element to be added simply needs to be outside both original sets.
Choices 19 and 20 in Table 4 were used to test Bottom Independence. In choice 19, one is sure of receiving 20 EUR if set F 1 = {20} is chosen. In set S 1 = {20, 18}, on the other hand, there is a certain, unknown probability of ending up with only 18 EUR. In this case, we would expect most people to choose set F 1 , since there is no apparent reason to do otherwise, except if the decision is based on maximal outcomes only, in which case one would be indierent between both sets. In choice 20, the original sets are enlarged with the same outcome, 1 EUR, which is considerably lower than all other outcomes. If most people prefer the rst set in choice 19, then, according to Bottom Independence, they should also do so in choice 20. However, in choice 20, the average over the three outcomes in set S 2 is higher than the average over the two outcomes in set F 2 . People who evaluate sets by performing some averaging operation over the outcomes might prefer the rst set in choice 19, and the second set in choice 20, and would thereby be violating Bottom Independence. The next two choices in Table 4 , were used to test Top Independence. These choices were constructed following the reverse recipe as for Bottom Independence. First, participants are asked to choose between a binary set, F 1 = {4, 3}, and a singleton, S 1 = {3}. Here, both sets have the same minimum, while in the test for Bottom Independence, the sets in the rst pair share their maximum. In choice 22, a considerably higher outcome, 35 EUR, is added to the original sets, which again results in an evident inequality between the rst and the second set in terms of the averages over the outcomes. Consequently, people who consider the average over the elements in each set might demonstrate pattern F 1 S 2 , i.e., they state preferences F 1 S 1 and S 2 F 2 , a violation of Top Independence. Our test for Disjoint Independence consists of Choices 29 and 30 6 .
Sets in Choice 29 do not have any outcomes in common. Here, everyone should prefer F 1 = {100}, because its certain outcome is higher than any of the outcomes S 1 = {95, 90}. In Choice 30, the same lower consequence was added to both original sets. Even though in this last choice, the maximum is still higher in set F 2 = {100, 10} than in set S 2 = {95, 90, 10}, the average over the outcomes is higher in the latter. People who choose F 1 in choice 29 and S 2 in choice 30 would be violating Disjoint
Independence.
6 The same set of stimuli could also be used to test Bottom Independence, but as rate of violations was higher for choices 19 and 20, both tests were reported.
Results. The number of people demonstrating each preference pattern for the two presentations of the eight experimental choices is reported in Table 5 . From these data, the rates of error and the true probabilities of preferring the second set were estimated for each choice. 
Bottom Independence 19(I) According to Dominance, people should demonstrate pattern F 1 F 2 . The rst row in Table 6 shows that the estimated probability of having F 1 F 2 as true preference pattern in the test for Dominance equals 97%. In this test, almost everybody's choices agree with Dominance.
If Neutrality holds, people should show either F 1 F 2 or S 1 S 2 . Instead, it is estimated that 92.2% of participants truly switch from F 1 in Choice 1 to S 2 in Choice 7 After extending the true and error model to a model capable of analyzing patterns consisting of three choices, adaptation for the analysis of patterns consisting of two choices is self-explanatory (e.g., Birnbaum, 2008 i.e., S 1 F 2 and F 1 S 2 , are incompatible with the independence axioms, patterns S 1 S 2 and F 1 F 2 agree with the axioms. In all three tests, most people are estimated to violate the axioms. In none of the rows did the sum ofp(F 1 F 2 ) andp(S 1 S 2 ) reach a majority. In the test for Bottom Independence (choices 19 and 20), 98.2% are estimated to have F 1 S 2 as their true preference pattern, while true preferences are estimated to comply with Bottom Independence for only 1.8% (p(F 1 F 2 ) +p(S 1 S 2 )).
The rates of violations of Top Independence and Disjoint Independence are 52.4% and 94.3%, respectively. Surprisingly, even though the choice stimuli were constructed using the samealbeit reversedrecipe, the violation rate is much lower for Top Independence than for Bottom Independence. In fact, although almost everybody chose S 2 = {20, 18, 1} instead of F 2 = {20, 1} in the test of Bottom Independence, also 46.4% truly preferred F 2 = {35, 4, 3} over S 2 = {35, 3} in the test of Top Independence (see Table 5 ). The latter preference statement does not match the assumption implied by models like UEU, according to which these stimuli were designed, i.e., that people rank sets according to the average over the values of the outcomes.
Discussion. The only axiom of Pattanaik and Peleg's (1984) axiomatization of the Leximin and Leximax rules that could not be refuted empirically is Dominance, which is considered an extremely plausible requirement, given the interpretation of . Our test of Neutrality demonstrated that most participants changed their preferences as the relative values of the outcomes in the sets to be compared changed, even though the comparative order of those outcomes over both sets remained the same. This nding entails that relative dierences between outcomes appear to play a role in choosing between sets of monetary consequences.
We were able to bring about substantial violation rates for all three independence axioms. Presumably, these violations occurred because the choice stimuli were constructed in such a way that the addition of a common element resulted in a reversal of the ranking of the set averages. Particularly for those people who actually evaluate sets by their average, such stimuli should give rise to preference statements that disagree with the independence axioms. Surprisingly, we found the violations to be substantially lower in number for Top Independence as compared to Bottom In-dependence and Disjoint Independence. Apparently, people are more likely to choose the set with the higher average if this is also the set with the highest cardinality, than when the set with the highest average has the least number of elements. This observation contradicts decision models like UEU, and is reminiscent of the Richness Appeal axiom 8 , proposed by Arlegi (2007) as an attitude towards uncertainty in the context of sequentially consistent rankings. Preferences complying with Richness Appeal might be indicative of a positive attitude towards a diversication uncertainty within the range of the minimum and maximum of a set; the decision maker prefers one more possible outcome instead of being constrained to the two extremes, even when the value of this middle outcome is very close to the minimum, resulting in a lower set average.
Minmax & Maxmin
Axioms and Stimuli. Arlegi (2003) postulated six axioms for the characterization of Minmax and Maxmin, each of which is described in more detail below.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion: For all x, y, z ∈ X, xP yP z ⇒ {y} {x, z}.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal: For all x, y, z ∈ X xP yP z ⇒ {x, z} {y}.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal are contrasting empirical assumptions regarding the decision maker's attitude towards uncertainty when comparing singletons and binary sets. Simple Uncertainty Aversion establishes that receiving an outcome y with certainty is always preferred to an uncertain prospect where either outcome x which is better than y or z which is worse than y may materialize.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal reects the dual attitude. This axiom prescribes that the possibility of receiving an outcome which is better than y, despite the fact 8 Richness Appeal: For all x, y, z ∈ X, xP yP z ⇒ {x, y, z} {x, z}.
Richness Appeal stipulates that any set of three outcomes is always considered better than the binary set consisting of its minimum and maximum.
that it is linked with the possibility of receiving an outcome worse than y, is always considered more attractive than receiving y with certainty.
Choices 15 and 16 in Table 7 were devised to test Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal. Like Neutrality, these axioms assume that only ordinal information about the outcomes is taken into account by the decision maker.
Consequently, if
represents uncertainty aversion, the certain option should be preferred in both choices, regardless of the fact that the certain outcome is much closer to the worst outcome of the uncertain prospect {25, 15} in Choice 16, i.e., S 2 = {16}, than in Choice 15, i.e., S 1 = {24}. Similarly, if represents uncertainty appeal, the uncertain option, {25, 15}, should be preferred in both choices. If the relative dierences in the positions of the objects do appear to matter (as was demonstrated in the test for Neutrality in the preceding section), it is not unthinkable that the certain outcome is chosen in the rst pair of sets, and the uncertain prospect in the second pair. 
Simple Bottom Monotonicity 38 I
Monotone Consistency 39 I F 2 = {20, 2, 1} S 2 = {20, 1}
* I
F 1 = {59, 5, 1} S 1 = {56, 5, 1}
F 3 = {59, 5, 1} S 3 = {56, 55, 5, 1} * Choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the rst position, and set F in the second position in the rst replicate. In the second replicate, these positions were reversed. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
Simple Top Monotonicity For all x, y, z ∈ X xP yP z ⇒ {x, z} {y, z}.
Simple Bottom Monotonicity For all x, y, z ∈ X xP yP z ⇒ {x, y} {x, z}.
Given a singleton {z} and two outcomes x and y, both of which are strictly better than z, Simple Top Monotonicity implies that {z} enlarged with the better of x and y will be strictly preferred to {z} enlarged with the worse of those two outcomes.
Simple Bottom Monotonicity is its dual, and applies to enlarging a singleton with worse outcomes. These axioms can be regarded as rationality conditions for choice under complete uncertainty (Bossert et al., 2000) , and were assessed with Choices 45 and 38 in Table 7 .
Monotone Consistency : For all A, B ∈ X,
Monotone Consistency requires that if a set A is at least as good as another set B, then B cannot be strictly better than the union of both A and B. Indeed, the union of A and B contains the same outcomes as B, plus those in A, which made the decision maker evaluate A as better than B. However, if one allows A and B to have at least one`high' outcome in common, it is possible to establish a reversal of the ranking of the set averages from the rst to the second choice, which might cause the decision maker to violate Monotone Consistency. This can be illustrated with Choices 38 and 39 in Table 7 . In Choice 38, sets F 1 = {20, 2} and S 1 = {20, 1} dier only in their minima. Consequently, as is also predicted by Simple Bottom Monotonicity, we expect people to choose F 1 , the set with the most favorable minimum. If we compare the union of F 1 and S 1 , i.e., F 2 = {20, 2, 1}, with S 2 = {20, 1}, the minima and maxima are equal in both sets, but F 2 has one more low outcome. The average over the outcomes is now more favorable in the second set. People who choose set F 1 in Choice 38 and set S 2 in Choice 39 would be violating Monotone Consistency.
Robustness: For all A, B, C ∈ X, A B and A C ⇒ A B ∪ C.
Robustness ensures that if A is weakly better than both B and C, then A is weakly better than the union of B and C.
Choices 47, 48 and 49 in Table 7 constitute a test for Robustness. By allowing the rst and second set to share their lowest outcomes, we were again able to produce a reversal in the ranking of the set averages from the rst two choices to Choice 49, which might lead some subjects to exhibit response pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 for the three choices, a violation of Robustness. Results. The true and error model was applied to estimate the proportion of participants who truly preferred the second set in each choice. The results are shown in The next two rows in Table 8 show that for Simple Top Monotonicity as well as Simple Bottom Monotonicity, everyone is estimated to choose accordingly. In fact, even the observed frequencies comply almost perfectly with the axioms; only one out of 101 participants showed pattern F 1 S 1 on the two presentations of Choice 45, all others choose F 1 F 1 in both axiom tests.
Considering the estimated choice probabilities for choices 38 and 39, we can see that everybody chose set F 1 in the rst choice and 62% were estimated to truly prefer set S 2 in the second choice. This means that 62% of all participants truly violated Monotone Consistency, since, according to this axiom, people who prefer F 1 to S 1 , should also prefer the union of F 2 to S 2 .
In the last three rows in Table 8 it is shown that all of the participants truly preferred the rst set in the rst two choices of the test for Robustness. 9 . In both cases, a signicant number of participants opted for the three-element set, despite the fact that its average over the outcomes is much lower than in the binary set. As mentioned, these unexpected results match the implications of Richness Appeal (Arlegi, 2007) 9 This is the choice between {35, 4, 3} and {35, 3}, see section Leximin & Leximax. Simple Monotonicity For all x, y ∈ X, xP y ⇒ {x} {x, y} {y}
Simple Monotonicity ensures that, if an outcome x is strictly preferred to another outcome y, then having x with certainty will be preferred to the uncertain prospect with the two possible outcomes x and y. The latter, in turn, will be preferred to having y with certainty. Obviously, Simple Monotonicity is fairly unquestionable in the context of choice under uncertainty. The rst two rows in Table 9 contain the pairs of sets that were used to test Simple Monotonicity.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal: For all x, y, z ∈ X, xP yP z ⇒ {x, z} {y}.
These axioms were already explained and tested in the previous section. The main results for the tests of Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal will be recaptured in the discussion Type 1 Dominance For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X, [xP aP y for all a ∈ A] ⇒ {x, y} A ∪ {y}.
Type 2 Dominance For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X, (Bossert, Pattanaik & Xu, 2000) .
Axiom
Set
Simple Monotonicity 13
Type 1 Dominance 14
Type 2 Dominance 17
Type 1 Extension Principle 10 *
Type 2 Extension Principle 6
Type 1 Monotonicity 22
Type 2 Monotonicity 27 *
Extension Independence 30
F 2 = {13, 11, 3} S 2 = {13, 11, 10, 3}
All of these tests were administered in Experiment II * In the rst replicate, choices marked with an asterisk were presented with set S in the rst position, and set F in the second position. In the second replicate, these positions were reversed. Unmarked choices were arranged in the opposite fashion.
[xP aP y for all a ∈ A] ⇒ A ∪ {x} {x, y}.
Type 1 Dominance ensures that if an outcome x is better than every outcome in a given set A, and y is worse than every outcome in A, then {x, y} will be preferred to A ∪ {y}. Analogously, if x and y are strictly better and strictly worse than every outcome in A, Type 2 Dominance ensures that A ∪ {x} is preferred to {x, y}. These conditions are stronger versions of Simple Top Monotonicity and Simple Bottom Monotonicity, which could not be refuted in the previous section. Yet, in contrast to the latter, Type 1 and Type 2 Dominance must also hold in the case where A ∪ {y} and A ∪ {x} contain more than two elements. Under those circumstances, however, it is possible to choose the middle elements in such a way that the average over the outcomes in the larger set is either higher or lower than in the binary set. Choices 14 and 17 in Table 9 were used to test Type 1 Dominance and Type 2 Dominance, respectively. In choice 14, the set average of S 1 = {28, 27, 3} is higher than the average of the two outcomes in F 1 = {29, 3}, which might lead people to violate Type 1 Dominance and choose S 1 . Similarly, choice 17 assesses Type 2 Dominance, but here F 1 = {20, 3, 2} has the lower average. This might cause people to choose S 1 = {20, 1}, which would be a violation of Type 2 Dominance.
Type 1 Extension Principle For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\A,
Type 2 Extension Principle For all A ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\A,
In a decision situation where outcomes x and y are outside of a given set A, and every distinct element a of A is, when received with certainty, preferred to the uncertain prospect {x, y}, and A itself is preferred to {x, y} as well, Type 1 Extension Principle implies that A∪{x, y} will be preferred to {x, y}. Type 2 Extension Principle is the dual which applies to situations where A, as well as all distinct elements a of A received with certainty, are ranked as less attractive than {x, y}. In order to reduce the number of choices needed to test these axioms, we constrained the decision problem to the simple case where A is a singleton, {a}. In an attempt to produce violations of Type 1 Extension principle, we used choice stimuli for which the value of a is situated somewhere in between the values of x and y. The value of a needs to be suciently high so that not too many subjects prefer {x, y} over a, because such choice patterns cannot be used to evaluate Type 1 Extension Principle. On the other hand, the value of a should not be too high, since, in order to obtain violations, we need {x, y} to be preferred over {x, a, y}. The reverse holds for Type 2 Extension Principle. Several combinations of values for a, x and y were tested. Those which yielded the most violations for either axiom are presented as choices 9, 10, 5, and 6 Table 9 .
Type 1 Monotonicity For all x ∈ X and all A, B ∈ X, ({x} A and {x} B) ⇒ {x} A ∪ B.
Type 2 Monotonicity For all x ∈ X and all A, B ∈ X, (A {x} and B {x}) ⇒ A ∪ B {x}.
Type 1 Monotonicity requires that if the certainty of having x is preferred to each of the sets A and B, then receiving x with certainty will also be preferred to the union of A and B. Type 2 Monotonicity is the dual of Type 1 Monotonicity.
In order to test Type 1 Monotonicity, A and B are both operationalized as binary sets which have their minimal element in common. That way, taking the union of both sets will result in a situation where the higher outcomes outweigh the lower one, as is shown in choices 21, 22, and 23 in Table 9 . Suppose that a decision maker prefers the certain outcome, i.e., F 1 and F 2 , in the rst two choices. In this case, Type 1 Monotonicity requires that she will also prefer the certain outcome in the third choice. However, as S 3 = {40, 35, 19} contains two outcomes which are higher than 27 EUR instead of just one, we might expect some people who safely opted for the certainty of receiving 27 EUR in choices 21 and 22 to switch to the uncertain prospect S 3 in the third choice.
In order to test Type 2 Monotonicity, A and B are again binary sets, now sharing their maximum. This results in a less favorable distribution of higher and lower outcomes if we take the union of both. Considering choices 24, 25, and 26 in Table 9 , someone showing pattern F 1 F 2 S 3 , would be contravening the implications of Type 2 Monotonicity.
Extension Independence For all A, B ∈ X and all x, y ∈ X\(A ∪ B),
Extension Independence requires that if every alternative in A ∪ B is worse than x and better than y, then the relative ranking of A ∪ {x, y} and B ∪ {x, y} is the same as the relative ranking of A and B.
Extension Independence was tested following a similar recipe as for Bottom Independence (see section Leximin & Leximax) . First, as shown in choice 29, participants are asked to choose between a singleton, F 1 = {11}, and a binary set, S 1 = {11, 10} of which the maximum equals the amount to be won if one chooses the singleton and the minimum is only slightly lower. Next, both sets are enlarged with one outcome which is considerably lower than the original ones and one which is just a little higher. In choice 30, we end up with two sets with the same minimum of which S 3 = {13, 11, 10, 3} has one more high outcome and thus a higher set average than F 3 = {13, 11, 3}. With these stimuli we attempted to elicit pattern F 1 S 2 , a violation of Extension Independence.
Results. Again, the true and error model (Birnbaum, 2004) was applied. For each choice, the error rates (e) and the true probability of preferring the second set (p) were estimated from the data in Table 10 . Table 10 : Replication data used to estimate true probability and error rate for each choice.
Set
Replication Patterns Choice First (F) Second(S)
Simple Monotonicity 29 from the rst to the second choice in both pairs. In both cases, the percentages of participants choosing the second set change in the corresponding direction. For example, in choice 25, the minimum is 1 EUR higher than in the preceding choice which should elicit a lower preference rate for the second set in choice 25 as compared to choice 24. Indeed, Table 10 shows thatp increases from 10.2% to 20%.
Further analyses of the demonstrated response patterns for the axiom tests comprising two choices are presented in Table 11 . showed each pattern for the rst presentation of these three choices (the rst replicate), the second presentation (the second replicate), and both presentations, respectively. The column labeled One not both contains the number of people who showed that pattern on one of the two replicates but not both. The sum of the frequencies in the One not both and Both columns adds to the total number of participants so none of the response patterns is counted twice. Estimated error rates are 0.041, 0.107, and 0.176 for Choices 21, 22, and 23, respectively. Evaluation of the true and error model yields χ 2 (5) = 4.52, an acceptable t.
The extended true and error model was also t to the frequencies in Table   13 . Here, a dierent pattern prevails. The percentage of participants that can be taken into account for the examination of Type 2 Monotonicity equals 79.6% Discussion. It has been demonstrated that Lexicographic Minmax and Maxmin do not perform well at all in predicting choices between sets of possible monetary outcomes. In order to get a better understanding of why these models fail to accommodate the preferences of real-life decision makers, the axioms characterizing these models, as proposed by Bossert et al. (2000) , were tested one by one.
Simple Monotonicity had the lowest violation rate, almost everybody's choices complied with this axiom.
As demonstrated in the section Minmax & Maxmin, Simple Uncertainty Aversion and Simple Uncertainty Appeal were both systematically violated, indicating that the strength of preference between outcomes is taken into consideration when making a decision.
Choice patterns for the vast majority of participants also disagreed with Ex- Extension Principle, no specic strategy was followed in order to provoke violations;
we just used a binary set and a singleton with an outcome situated somewhere in the middle between the ones in the binary set. Consequently, it rather came as a surprise that an extremely large portion of participants violated Type 2 Extension Principle.
However, for Type 1 Extension Principle, violations were virtually nonexistent. Again, it is shown that, when confronted with the choice between a binary set and a set with the same elements enlarged with some extra outcome in the middle, people are inclined to choose the larger set, which perfectly ts the implications of the Richness Appeal axiom. In order to challenge Type 1 and Type 2 Monotonicity, the proportion of outcomes higher/lower than the certain outcome was manipulated in the uncertain prospect. This yielded a high violation rate for Type 1 Monotonicity, while the violation rate for Type 2 Monotonicity was rather low. A second diculty in testing these four axioms is that for the choice patterns to be eligible for the evaluation of the axiom, one or two conditional preferences which were not so obvious to elicit had to be stated. Conversely, the other axiom tests in this paper consisting of more than one choice lend themselves to evaluation with stimulus pairs where the desired response in the conditional choice(s) would occur if people choose according to Simple Top or Bottom Monotonicity or Dominance, which was as good as always the case.
Notwithstanding these impediments, we were able to bring about substantial violation rates for one of the two counterparts in both axiom pairs. Knowing that any couple of two dual axioms is supposed to represent the same property, albeit in dierent directions, we are inclined to believe that the actual properties represented by these axioms do not hold in general and that it is a rather unfortunate choice of stimuli which is responsible for the lack of violations of Type 1 Extension Principle and Type 2 Monotonicity.
Summary and General Discussion
This In the rst experimental section of this paper, it was shown that the Min and Max induced rankings perform particularly worse than UEU in predicting real-life decision makers' preferences over sets of monetary outcomes. When presented with a binary set and a three-element set with a higher average over the elements but a lower minimum and maximum than the binary set, the grand majority chose the set with the better average, contrary to the implications of the Min and Max induced rankings.
Notwithstanding the fact that these rankings were rather easily rejected, we decided to further investigate their axiomatic underpinnings. Finding out which axioms hold, which do not, and whether we can we group them in some way according to certain characteristics might facilitate the development of models that are more accurate in the descriptive sense.
In fact, analysis of the axioms characterizing Min and Max induced rankings yielded four large categories:
Dominance and
Monotonicity conditions, axioms ensuring that only ordinal information is used, axioms that prevent rankings to be based on average-goodness, and a rest category with four axioms.
Very few violations were observed for Dominance and its weaker version Simple
Monotonicity. Both these axioms rule out rankings of sets that are based ontotalgoodness criteria (Pattanaik & Peleg, 1984) . Dominance, for example, implies that enlarging a set with an element which is worse than all the original elements will decrease the attractiveness of that set, although enlarging a set would always increase its total worth. Since as good as every participant's choices complied with Dominance as well as Simple Monotonicity, we can conclude that in the current context, where sets represent uncertain prospects for which only one outcome can materialize, people do not evaluate sets by their total goodness.
We were unable to provoke even the slightest true" violation of Simple Top
Monotonicity and Simple Bottom Monotonicity. Both these monotonicity conditions ensure that replacing one set element with a better one yields a better set. Like Dominance and Simple Monotonicity, these axioms seem fairly unquestionable, which was conrmed by the results.
We tested three axioms that ensure that only ordinal information about the outcomes is considered by the decision makers: Neutrality, Simple Uncertainty Appeal, and Simple Uncertainty Aversion. All three of them could be refuted on a large scale. Although the Min and Max induced rankings are convenient for constructing rankings over sets from nothing more but the ordinal data of people's rankings over outcomes, we clearly demonstrated that the relative dierences in the positions of monetary outcomes have a substantial eect on stated preferences. It is suspected that this nding also applies to other types of outcomes. For example, in the case of election candidates the decision maker does not only prefer some candidate X over another candidate Y , but, in many cases she also prefers X to some extent over Y . Thus, if one's goal is to develop a descriptively plausible model for the ranking of sets of possible outcomes, the strength of preference over set elements should be incorporated in that model.
Several axioms in the characterizations of Min and Max induced rankings prevent preferences to be based on average-goodness considerations as implied by UEU, i.e., calculating the arithmetic average of the utilities of the outcomes 10 . In order to test these axioms, stimuli were constructed in such a way that the axiom in question is violated if the subjects consistently choose the set with the higher average over the outcomes. This method yielded major violationsviolation rates ranging from 52% to 89%for all but one of the axioms in this group. For unknown reasons, the test of Type 2 Dominance produced only 22.5% violations. Although non-negligible, this violation rate is substantially lower than those resulting from the tests of the other axioms in this group. Possibly, a stronger refutation of Type 2 Dominance would be established if choices were administered with an even larger dierence in the averages of the sets to be compared.
More dicult to interpret are the results for the remaining four axioms: Type Experimental research in the domain of set ranking has hitherto given us some
hints as to what requirements should be met by rankings that are intended to model actual choice behavior for a signicant portion of people. First of all, we suspect that such a ranking has to be transitive (Vrijdags, 2010) . Furthermore, it should meet the requirements of Dominance, Simple Top and Simple Bottom Monotonicity. It must also take into account the strength of preference between outcomes, and it should not prevent sets to be evaluated according to their average-goodness.
The UEU criterion appears to satisfy every single one of these requirements, yet some observations were made that cast serious doubt on the validity of UEU as a descriptive model. Entries underp show the true probability of preferring the second set (S) in each choice, estimated with the true and error model. The error rates for these choices are listed under e. The χ 2 (1)'s in the right-most column evaluate the t of the true and error model, which is acceptable in all three cases (α = .05).
In all three choices in Table 14 , a substantial number of people truly preferred set F , the set with the lowest average. Such preferences are hard to explain with UEU, unless an extremely risk averse utility function is assumed for all subjects choosing the rst set, which seems rather implausible. One way to avoid having to estimate utility functions is by verifying whether these people's preferences satisfy the behavioral axioms characterizing UEU. Therefore, an experimental study of these axioms will be the focus of our future research. This way, we hope to determine to what extent UEU applies.
A possible explanation for the results in Table 14 might be found along the lines of Arlegi's Richness Appeal axiom. (Arlegi, 2007) which states that any set of three outcomes is always considered better than the binary set containing only the minimum and maximum. Richness Appeal does not strictly apply to Choice 17, since these sets do not share their minimum. However, some stronger version of the axiom can be thought of that explains a preference for the three element set in this choice as well. The main underlying idea would be that some people appear to be drawn to a diversication of uncertainty in the form of larger sets, as long as this diversication does not go below the worst possible outcome. This unanticipated,
yet interesting phenomenon appears to be fairly robust, similar choices in other tests reported in this paper endorse it, as well as the unreported data 11 . Considering the results for the test of Dominance, we can assume that this inclination towards larger sets is not the result of mistakenly evaluating sets by their total goodness.
In conclusion, the Min and Max induced rankings do a pretty bad job; they are clearly and easily rejected. Their main virtue is that their use does not require the elicitation of any parameter which is probably why they have been so popular in the literature, despite their low plausibility. In this paper, a descriptive attitude was adopted, a quite dierent perspective. For the modeling of observed set rankings, UEU seems to be a far more valuable candidate. However, for a considerable group of people we suspect that they do not use UEU, neither any of the Min and Max induced rankings investigated in this paper, but some other decision rule which might be characterized by a preference for a particular diversication of uncertainty. 
